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thority than the present clerk to the Guardians would be a safer instrument, and one less likely to cause local friction.

HELEN BOSANQUET.

OXSHOTT, SURREY.

CHARITY AND THE POOR LAW. S. D. Fuller. London: Swan Sonnenschein & Co., 1901. Pp. 68.

This is a little book of very different calibre to the foregoing. It consists of some papers and memoranda somewhat disjointedly put together, by the sometime Chairman of the Paddington Board of Guardians. The Paddington Board is one much esteemed for the carefulness of its work; but its view of the object of Poor Law Relief is somewhat eccentric, and it is that view which finds expression in this book. Briefly put it is that Poor Law Relief is the reward of good conduct, to be given to "the deserving," and to be used for the education of the poor, "as their merits so their reward." The author is however well aware of the dangers attendant upon our out-relief policy, and a strong advocate also of coöperation between Poor Law and Charity.

HELEN BOSANQUET.

OXSHOTT, SURREY.

FACT AND FABLE IN PSYCHOLOGY. By Joseph Jastrow, Professor of Psychology in the University of Wisconsin. London: Macmillan & Co., 1901.

This book deals with a subject which certainly deserves more attention from professed psychologists than it has hitherto received. The subject is described by the general term of "the occult,"—the supernormal phenomena, alleged to be facts, on which the theories of theosophy, spiritualism, thought-transference, occult healing, etc., are based. All this is relegated by Professor Jastrow to the region of "fable." The purpose of the book is entirely critical; he dwells on no more "fact" in psychology than is necessary to expose the "fables." His conclusions are essentially the same as those of Professor Münsterberg in his brilliant essay on "Psychology and Mysticism"; but he gives a more careful account of the origin of the alleged phenomena. Münsterberg's sweeping dismissal of them all would compel us to repeat at our leisure what David is reported to have said in his haste.

The book consists of a series of essays most of which have al-

ready been published. The most important essay, and the one which calls for most criticism, is the second, on "The Problems of Psychical Research." Whatever the author may have intended, this part of his work is calculated to convey to the reader the unfortunate impression that Professor Jastrow agrees with such "fine old crusted enemies of superstition" as the eminent biologist to whom Professor James referred (*Mind*, No. 5, p. 144), "who once said that if the facts of telepathy *were* true, the first duty which every honest man would owe to science would be to deny them, and prevent them if possible from ever becoming known." We gather that in Professor Jastrow's opinion it is no part of the *trained* psychologist's work to investigate any of the alleged occult phenomena until their truth and reality is demonstrated far more decidedly than it is at present (p. 73). But from other passages we understand that no one who is not a trained psychologist has a right to investigate them at all. It is the attitude of the proverbial "dog in the manger," applied in science. The author objects to the name "psychical research" as applied to such various inquiries as those undertaken by the Society in question; he objects that "the differentiation of a group of problems on the basis of unusualness of occurrence, of mysteriousness of origin, of doubtful authenticity, or of apparent paradoxical or transcendent character, is as illogical as it is unnecessary" (p. 53); he objects to the investigation of the alleged phenomena in order to see if there is "anything in" them, that is, any evidence of "supernormal" mental powers; he objects that the Society's work has attracted the public interest away from psychology proper (p. 75). Now the present writer holds no brief for the S. P. R. But to him, simply as a member of the outside public, it seems evident that these inquiries were called "Psychical Research" simply for want of a better name; that these investigators have quite as much right to use the name as the laboratory psychologist has, and that the alleged phenomena, which were becoming the hunting ground of charlatans and their dupes, need to be investigated by *some one* in a scientific spirit, if the professed psychologists will not do so—which is usually the case. Further, we notice that the scientific psychologist usually treats *abnormal* facts of mind as *pathological*. And the S. P. R. of necessity was driven to inquire whether there is "anything in" these things, for this is simply the question which is begged by the scientific psychologist: Is there anything abnormal or "supernormal" in mind which is *not pathological*?

Again, there is reason to believe that our author takes an entirely unjustifiable view of the present status of psychology. Is he prepared seriously to maintain that in a body of doctrine where standpoint, method, and principles are subjects of ever renewed controversy, there is any "logical unity of method and purpose?" Are there not better grounds for holding that there is no science of psychology, but only the hope of one? He says: "However ignorant they may be of one author's facts, the chemist and the psychologist readily appreciate one another's purposes, and find a bond of sympathy in the pursuit of a commonly inspired though differently applied method" (p. 47). As a brief commentary on this statement, I may refer to "The Story of Nineteenth Century Science," a work by a competent student of natural science, which contains a chapter on the progress of psychology during the century. The author speaks of reform in methods of treating the insane; of researches into nerve fibres and the histology of the nervous system; and of cerebral localization. The only psychological topics referred to are Weber's Law and the hypnotic state; these are treated in a very superficial way. In the same way we constantly find that capable students of physical science have no conception of what psychology can be apart from physiology.

Finally, Professor Jastrow says (p. vii): "It is a matter of importance that the dominant interest in psychology should centre about the normal use and development of functions with respect to which psychology bears a significant message for the regulation of life." Now this book is presumably intended for the general reader; hence it is not an *argumentum ad hominem* to ask what the general reader will make of such a statement if he should happen to read Professor Münsterberg's "Psychology and Life." The latter has as much right to speak of the meaning of psychology as our author has; and he makes psychology an artificial construction of the objective aspects of mind out of sensations—a construction which, as he elaborately shows, does not give us the truth and reality of mind, and has no practical bearing on life.

In a word, the reply to our author's attack on Psychical Research is—"Physician, heal thyself."

In the essay on "The Logic of Mental Telegraphy," Professor Jastrow engages in psychical research himself, and finds no evidence for the legitimacy of the telepathic hypothesis. But in the interesting essay on "Hypnotism and its Antecedents," he explains many difficult facts by referring to "unconscious suggestion"; and

some forms of this unconscious suggestion are not easily distinguished from what has been called "telepathy." In other essays the author shows, with vigor and success, the extraordinary difficulties of accurate observation in the case of abnormal phenomena.

S. H. MELLONE.

HOLYWOOD, BELFAST, IRELAND.

A STUDY OF SOCIAL MORALITY. By W. A. Watt, M. A., W. W. B., D. Phil., Glasgow. Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1901.

Mr. Watt is a Glasgow writer who has hitherto written on legal and political philosophy. In this book he enters the field of ethics. It may be described as a discussion of the *axiomata media* of morality. Towards the close of the book, and to some extent throughout it, an idealistic solution of the problem of conduct is more or less suggested. But in the main Mr. Watt is investigating the meaning of such terms as justice, benevolence, virtue, duty etc. The book is divided into two parts, the first dealing with the standpoint of virtue, and the second with social organization. In this latter part the author discusses the social groups of the family, church, state, etc. Curiously enough two chapters in this part, viz., chapters V. and VI., deal with some aspects of the individual life and with moral rules and resolutions respectively. One would have thought that they come more naturally into Part I. Be that as it may, Mr. Watt writes in an interesting manner. But it must be said that there is a general sense of inconclusiveness, and one may even add want of order, throughout the whole book. This may partly arise from the very attempt to reach "an ethical system of some sort—a resting-place, a few steps removed, as it were from the details of life" (p. 1). The late Dr. Sidgwick has shown in a striking way the incoherence and confusion of ideas in the popular moral consciousness. A system, "a few steps removed" from it, must inevitably share in its defects; though it may be useful as a stepping-stone to something better.

It is impossible within the limits of this brief notice to discuss in detail Mr. Watt's positions. But one may instance his treatment of justice. Justice is made to include "the legal system generally" (p. 3). But there are many laws, the breakers of which are not called unjust, *e. g.*, the gaming laws. Of course